Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that posthostility activities, to include peacekeeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations, are the most vital yet difficult steps in bringing war to an acceptable conclusion. Given this, it would seem that mastery of this phase of any conflict would be a priority requirement. Remarkably, our military is reluctant and even neglectful in planning and executing these challenging operations; operations that are clearly essential to achieving our political objectives and securing our national interests. This paper explores the impact of Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000.05, which directs DoD to embrace Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations (SSTRO) as a core competency. The paper also provides the historical context and rationale for prioritizing related SSTRO equivalent to traditional and conventional combat operations. Additionally, it examines existing cultural impediments to institutionalizing proficiency in SSTRO and highlights the need for managing cultural change in order to embrace these operations. Finally, the paper presents recommendations for future training and leader professional development that inculcates in our future leaders a warrior ethos that includes the planning and execution of post-hostility SSTRO.
INTRODUCTION
An historical review of U.S. involvement in armed conflict consistently reveals that posthostilities activities, to include: peace-keeping/enforcement, nation assistance, reconstruction, and stability operations (referred to as Phase IV operations within a military campaign) are usually the most vital yet problematic steps in bringing any conflict to an acceptable conclusion.
Labeling political and economic reconstruction as a postwar problem muddles the fact that central to strategic victory in all wars fought by the United States has been the creation of a favorable political order… 2 Given this, it would seem that professional mastery of this phase, especially at the operational and strategic levels of leadership, is an absolute requirement for victory and should be a priority mission area. Notwithstanding, our military tends to be very reluctant and somewhat neglectful in planning and executing these most challenging operations; operations that are essential for achieving our political objectives, securing our national interests, and consolidating victory. This paper, 1) provides background and a conceptual framework for examining SSTR requirements and explores the historical precedence and contemporary challenges for accomplishing post-hostility missions; 2) examines the current U.S. military culture as a major impediment to successful execution of these operations and proposes a means for overcoming the institutional cultural barriers in order to embrace this mission; and finally, 3) makes recommendations for future training and leader professional development in order to increase our capability to successfully execute these operations. These recommendations focus on developing and inculcating a warrior ethos that places execution of post-hostility SSTR equivalent with traditional and conventional combat operations.
BACKGROUND
The US military's joint doctrine for the conduct of campaigns, Joint Publication 3-0 (Operations), outlines a phasing model that provides the Joint Force Commander (JFC) a standard yet flexible construct in which to focus the force toward related but distinct phased activities. A brief description of the six phases follows:
• Phase 0 -Shape -Operations designed to assure success by creating perceptions and influencing the behavior of adversaries and allies, developing military capabilities, information and intelligence sharing, and providing peacetime and contingency access.
• Phase I -Deter -Intent is to deter undesirable adversary action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint force.
• Phase II -Seize Initiative -Executing offensive operations at the earliest possible time in order to set conditions for decisive operations.
• Phase III -Dominate -Overmatching joint force capability at the critical time and place in order to break the enemy's will for organized resistance and gain control of the operational environment.
• Phase IV -Stabilize -Required when there is little or no functioning legitimate civil government to perform local governance. It involves integrating multinational efforts, Other Government Agencies (OGA), International Governing Agencies (IGA), and/or NonGovernmental Agencies (NGO) until legitimate local entities are functioning.
• Phase V -Enable Civil Authority -Joint force support to legitimate civil authority with the goal of enabling the viability of the civil authority and its provision of essential services to a majority of the populace in the region. 3 Within this campaign conceptual construct, the military performs specific missions defined by a unique but related set of tasks and operational environmental conditions. For specified missions related to post-hostility activities, this paper will treat SSTR as including the doctrinal missions of: Peacekeeping, 4 Peace Enforcement, 5 Nation Assistance, 6 Stability Operations, 7 and Security Operations. 8 It is largely in the performance of these missions that responsibilities and authorities become convoluted among US, foreign, and non-governmental participants;
especially so between the Department of State (DoS) and the Department of Defense (DoD).
Historically, there has been a confusing debate as to which Department (DoD vice the DoS) should have the lead in SSTRO. In November 1942, President Roosevelt assigned the responsibility of post-war occupation duties to the DoS. This was in direct contradiction of Army doctrine that specified the theater commander would act as the military governor for posthostility occupation activities. In response to Roosevelt's guidance, the DoS established the Office of Foreign Territories; however, it accomplished little and was soon disbanded because, when applied to North Africa, it proved completely dependent on the military for execution. If you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after effect, you may be too exhausted to profit by the peace, while it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war. Within certain on-going mission constraints, the entire operational force is essentially "surge capable." As a result, DoD is the only U.S. government department capable of quickly deploying and sustaining sufficient assets to conduct these operations. It is, consistent with our history, the only viable or practical alternative.
Unfortunately, the dichotomy continues: the DoS has the assigned responsibility but no resources; the DoD has the resources but not the responsibility and, by default, eventually muddles into SSTR execution with forces poorly prepared to do these kinds of operations.
Correspondingly, the Secretary of Defense (recognizing DoS' historic inability to effectively execute these operations) issued a directive that placed the missions associated with SSTRO squarely on the shoulders of the Service Secretaries and Geographical Combatant
Commanders. Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organization, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning. 20 The U.S. military has made several adjustments over the last decade to enable troops to perform peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. However, actions in Iraq and
Afghanistan reinforce criticisms that the military remains largely ineffectual in performing posthostility missions; especially compared with its ability to conduct traditional combat operations.
The above directive should provide both the impetus and management attention to improve associated military force structure and the defense planning and execution of SSTRO. But however clear the DoD directive, execution will be problematic. This change requires a dramatic shift in the military culture and is further undermined by the illusionary central role of the DoS. As a consequence, DoD is currently unsure of the steps it will take to implement SSTRO. Surely, it will use the directive to request changes in legislation, regulations, authority and, of course, request additional funding. 21 But those steps are for the DoD civilian leadership to pursue. Tangible methods of implementing this directive through the re-design of existing military force structure, individual and collective training, and professional leader development programs will necessarily be the charter of senior uniformed leaders.
CHANGING THE MILITARY CULTURE
The institutional and cultural impediments to preparing for or adopting SSTRO as core competencies are a result of a confluence of diverse factors. Foremost, is the inherent cultural bias emanating from the constitutionally-based separation of the military from the governance role. 22 Additionally, there is the continued institutional focus on conventional combat operations generated by the military's Cold War focus on fighting and winning a high-intensity war against the Soviet threat. 23 This focus was reinforced by almost 45 years of training and volumes of associated doctrinal literature.
Within the military, doctrine in and of itself reflects the organizational culture and disposition. 24 Not too long ago, U.S. war fighting doctrine was almost completely devoted to total victory, relegating peace operations to only an unpopular topic separate rather than closely connected to decisive combat operations. 25 The 2000 version of FM 41-10, Civil Affairs
Operations, which had been used fairly extensively in the 50s and 60s, "dropped reference to military government, except for two pages on civil administration in occupied territories." 26 territories. 27 Add to this, the purging from our doctrine of many of the related counterinsurgency and peacekeeping lessons following the Vietnam War by an army intent on avoiding associated nation assistance tasks. The result is an existing body of doctrinal literature almost devoid of SSTRO 28 guiding an acculturated military postured and prepared to concentrate mass and firepower to destroy the enemy…and not prepared to conduct SSTRO. 29 The American Army, at the tactical level, can be self-critical and quickly learn from its mistakes. This, however, does not mean it is an institution that changes its culture quickly. The
Army's identity is still focused on its core competency of defeating conventional enemy forces despite the fact that most of our 13 conflicts since the 1800s were limited wars fought for limited objectives. Unfortunately, the cultural impediments for internalizing SSTR competencies are also strengthened by the personal experience and professional upbringing of Army senior leadership. Senior Army leaders, primarily trained during the Cold War, are habitually trained for success at the high-intensity end of the combat spectrum essentially becoming "major combat operations focused" vice "full spectrum capable." 34 The basic logic for this focus was that resources limited the ability to prepare for all levels of potential contingency operations, so if the Army was trained for the most violent and high risk contingencies, it was logically capable of adapting to lower risk or less violent operations. "A common assumption was that if the military trained for major combat operations, it would be able to easily handle less violent operations like peacekeeping and counterinsurgency. But that assumption proved to be wrong…" 35 We have since learned that in many ways SSTR is significantly more intellectually challenging. Army leaders, consciously or sub-consciously, are reluctant to focus training on non-kinetic solutions or disciplines (ex: negotiation competency or aptitude for civil administration) because these were not professional skills essential for operations against the USSR during the Cold War, nor were they necessary to defeat the notional enemy played by opposing U.S. forces at the training centers during the 1990s. magnitude of the problem -they simply did not know any better. 38 Meyers and Franks reflect an existing military cultural blind spot. The solution to this problem is more difficult and takes much longer to remedy because it requires a major overhaul and dramatic retooling of our leader professional development program and a deliberate strategy to change the existing culture. 39 Despite the fact that cultural change in the Army is extremely difficult, adopting force-wide SSTR capabilities and embedding those professional competencies within the force is not only imperative but also feasible.
Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible. In fact, cultural change is imperative if an organization is to grow, develop, and adapt to the changing environment within which it exists. 40 …Strategic leaders proactively manage change through the processes associated with embedding their vision within the organization and shaping organizational culture to support the vision.
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To effect the required cultural changes, military strategic leaders must take a leading role in transitioning from our current focus on conventional combat operations and develop it into a profession wherein SSTR tasks are of equal importance. Complying with DoD Directive 3000.05 and embracing SSTRO as a core U.S. military competency requires a major cultural azimuth change. Fortunately, there exist conceptual frameworks to help guide this transition.
There is a rich theoretical and conceptual body of literature developed for managing cultural change in the private sector that is applicable to the military. John Kotter, one of the world's foremost experts on business leadership, published a relevant framework for managing change in his book, Leading Change. The author clearly understands that the military is not a commercial business; nevertheless, Kotter's book provides a detailed road map for transforming large organizations with an eight-stage process that is general enough to allow application to military organizations. 42 Similarly, Edgar H. Schein outlines in his book, Organizational Culture and Leadership, embedding and reinforcing mechanisms for implementing cultural changes. 43 These embedding mechanisms closely support the military's leadership ethos and, if used by our strategic leaders, will most expeditiously effect the necessary cultural change required to embrace SSTRO as core competencies. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide a detailed strategy for embedding cultural change, six of Schien's embedding measures are clearly applicable:
• What leaders pay attention to, measure, and control on a regular basis communicates in much stronger terms than mere written policy what they think is important. Consequently, senior leaders must establish definitive doctrine and tangible measures of effectiveness for the attainment of training standards in order to gauge SSTR competency within the force.
• How leaders react to critical incidents and organizational crises within the force is critical to establishing the credibility of a leader and his commitment to achieving the vision. Adjusting the culture and training methodology to create SSTR competency must anticipate the angst created by the dilution (to some degree) of the force's conventional combat capability; so, the leader's actions to mitigate the risk to mission and personnel will play a pivotal role in the successful embedding of SSTR competency in the force.
• Deliberate role modeling, teaching, and coaching are all necessary embedding mechanisms. Commanders have long understood that in order to realize their vision, they must use every opportunity to communicate its meaning and applicability to subordinates. Commanders must assume the SSTR mantra and maintain a constant drumbeat in their teaching and mentoring of subordinates in preparing for or executing SSTR supporting tasks.
• Observed criteria by which leaders allocate resources, or in other words, which projects receive an organization's time, talent, and money most effectively communicates and focuses organizational energy. As directed by DoD Directive 3000.05, SSTR capability must garner its requisite portion of an organization's resources or it simply will not be internalized.
• Criteria by which leaders allocate rewards and status can be a leader's most powerful agent for change. Leaders who are creative thinkers can foster healthy, internal competition and recognition that offers huge incentive to those organizations that successfully master SSTRO.
• Criteria by which leaders recruit, select, promote, and punish organizational members may be the leader's most powerful mechanism to embed cultural change. Senior leaders should establish selection and promotion criteria based on demonstrated SSTR mastery comparable to conventional combat skills proficiency. Clearly Schein's embedding and reinforcing mechanisms provide an excellent guide for senior leaders navigating the services through the cultural change necessary to develop core competencies in SSTR comparable to conventional combat operational missions. Both Schein's measures and Kotter's systematic 8-step program for managing change provide an effective methodology for transitioning the military's culture within its officer and non-commissioned officer corps. Similarly, the military must also undertake a deliberate training and education approach to develop that capability within its leaders and units.
LEADER DEVELOPMENT, TRAINING, AND EDUCATION
While the Army, as an institution, does not rapidly change, it does routinely respond to identified weaknesses and then quickly devises effective solutions to correct deficiencies. The Army trains well because one of its core competencies and Title 10 mandates is to man, equip, maintain, and train land forces. It achieves readiness by developing combat-like experiences through tough, imaginative, realistic, multi-echeloned, and fully integrated training that individually and collectively develops the combat capability of the force. Leader development and education is an integral part of a training strategy and consists of three interacting core domains: self-development, operational, and institutional. 44 Self-development is extremely important but is the least tangible of the three core domains of leader development. Briefly stated, it is a continual, career-long process of life-long learning that occurs during institutional training and during operational assignments. Self-study, professional reading, and most importantly, leader feedback constitute the main source of selfawareness -these in turn provide a basic knowledge of personal strengths and weaknesses to assist in learning required skills. 45 Leader development in the operational core domain occurs through mentorship at every level of command in units/organizations, through individual and collective training at home station, during major training exercises, Combat Training Center (CTC) rotational deployments, and while conducting the full spectrum of real-world operations. 46 Because units have limited resources and a finite amount of time in which to prepare for deployment, leaders must prioritize which missions they will prepare their units to perform.
Home station training will usually focus on the core conventional combat operations and/or support missions for which the units were doctrinally designed. However, under the previously mentioned SSTR DoD directive, that is simply not enough. They must be trained to execute their tasks under conditions found throughout the broad spectrum of operations that include exercising the "soft" skills required for constabulary duties and SSTRO usually associated with Phases IV and V. Additionally, leaders must train their units in scenarios that include joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational (JIIM) participants. Herein is the conundrum and resultant overarching challenge. The U.S. military must (with little additional time or money) continue to produce units led by competent warrior leaders who are without peer in their conventional shoot, move, and communicate skills AND that are also masters of SSTRO…yet not become a "peace-corps with guns." It is well beyond the scope of this paper to outline all common tactical skills associated with the range of SSTR operational missions, but in order to meet this requirement, the Army must develop doctrine and related tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) and train SSTR tasks that align with similar conventional tactical and operational tasks already being trained within its institutions.
Our Joint and National Combat Training Centers (CTC) can also contribute to SSTR mastery. For over 20 years, the training centers have become world-class combat simulation laboratories. They provide realistic scenarios against professional opposing forces on diverse terrain, during a limited but demanding period of time in a carefully observed force-on-force exercise. Combined arms units periodically rotate through these training centers and perform the planning, preparation, and execution of directed missions and then receive candid evaluations of their performance by professional, doctrinally-sound, and expert observer/controllers. This collective training regimen has produced arguably the finest trained military units in the history of warfare, "having played a key role in the U.S. Army's success in Operation Desert Shield/Storm…and in the initial phases of Operation Iraqi Freedom." 47 The challenge is to build upon the training center concept and increase the scope of the training to address SSTRO; however, the current training center construct has certain limitations. SSTRO usually requires a complex operational and strategic environment consisting of large numbers of civilians residing within various types of urban terrain with associated public administrative, law and order, and infrastructure support challenges. These conditions are dramatically different than those faced by a maneuver force fighting conventional operations at the CTCs against an opposing force of similar capability all operating within relatively sparsely occupied terrain. Moreover, SSTR problems and corresponding responses take a very long time to develop and implement -usually much longer than units can reasonably spend during a CTC rotation. Nevertheless, the Army and joint community should exploit developing technology to provide the context and training support required to develop proficiencies in SSTRO.
Live-Virtual-Constructive-Integrated-Architecture (LVC-IA) is a critical component of the Army's training transformation. It is a network-centric linkage that collects and assimilates information between live and simulation instrumentation. This capability can be integrated and linked to our joint capabilities enabling commanders of all services to apply lessons learned from training and operational experience seamlessly between training institutions, home station, CTCs, and real-world deployed locations. It also provides the capability to generate an overarching scenario (referred to as a synthetic training environment (STE)) that incorporates associated modeling and simulation technology to virtually portray a wide range of participants and complex conditions that can be used dynamically to conduct command post exercises or augment collective training events. 48 The LVC-IA training capability can portray within the STE the JIIM environment and enable concurrent multi-echelon training in virtual and/or constructive modes while also integrating actual live training operations conducted at home station or at the CTCs. This also enables "the Army to execute combined arms and joint training, mission planning and rehearsals at home station, en route, and at deployed locations." 49 Here is a brief example of a potential application to training at a CTC. Leader training and development in the institutional core domain may be the most important. Most commanders or senior leaders agree that one of their highest priorities is subordinate leader development. 50 Correspondingly, senior leaders have the most influence in the manner in which our institutions train and develop future leaders.
To inculcate heretofore ignored SSTR competencies, senior leaders must begin at the junior leader level by identifying and formally evaluating potential and developing the corresponding strategic meta-competencies -identity, mental agility, cross-cultural savvy, interpersonal maturity, world-class warrior, and professional astuteness. 51 These attributes and skills are consistent with a future leader likened to a well-rounded athlete -a "penthathlete" - traditionally associated with social science disciplines. This is because all graduates are required to take an engineering-heavy course load and a host of other technical courses as part of the core curriculum. 53 Clearly, mathematics, physics, and chemistry are important but their relevance may be overemphasized given the current and future operational and strategic environments. Even the most technical military science skills (artillery gunnery or tactical bridge emplacement) required of company-grade officers seldom require more than basic mathematical and engineering skills. On the other hand, skills required for SSTR mastery are more appropriately aligned with interpersonal-relation disciplines, listed as pentathlete attributes, such as cross-cultural savvy and interpersonal maturity. These are cultivated in the sociology, psychology, political science, foreign language, civil/public administration, history, and criminal justice educational disciplines. 56 Most officers serving today agree that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a positive "forcing function" to create joint readiness and our combat record since then testifies to its value.
On the other hand, our interagency cooperation continues to suffer from many of the maladies that afflicted the joint force prior to GNA.
For years, the United States has underinvested in the civilian capabilities needed to partner with its military forces to achieve success in complex operations...postconflict operations are an intrinsic rather than optional part of winning a warsuggest that it is high time the United States develop and institutionalize the civilian and military capabilities it needs to be successful in such complex operations. 
CONCLUSION
The US is again faced with the profound challenges of effectively executing SSTRO. Not surprisingly, the military has again found itself executing a mission set for which it is ill-prepared.
Recognizing this deficiency, and as a long term remedy, DoD directed that the military prepare to plan and execute SSTRO with the same priority that it conducts conventional combat operations. How well the military will be able to comply depends on both the recognition of the dramatic challenges in overcoming existing institutional and cultural impediments and the comprehensive integration of current and future operational and institutional leader development and training programs. To effectively develop SSTRO competency, our senior strategic leadership must lead decisively, implement enabling reforms, and employ reinforcing and embedding mechanisms to overcome significant cultural impediments. Additionally, we must improve and modernize our self-development, operational, and institutional core domains of leader development, training, and education to effect the necessary transformation to meet these challenges now and in the future. This will require significant investment of time, talent, and resources. Nevertheless, the alternative consequences are severe. Using our most recent experience as a touchstone, failure in SSTR-dependent phases of conflict (IV and V) will be measured in terms of the lives of our Nation's sons and daughters, our national treasure, and overall strategic success.
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